This paper analyzes the impact of takeover threats on long term industrial relations. It argues that takeover threats dramatically affect the way in which an increase in a stakeholder's bargaining power affects (under)investment. In the absence of takeovers, the higher the stakeholder's bargaining power, the lower the firm's incentive to invest, but the higher the stakeholder's investment. In particular, when the stakeholder's investment relaxes the firm's financial constraint, higher stakeholder bargaining power may increase the value of the firm. Under the threat of a takeover which would reduce his expected compensation, the stakeholder's investment is restricted and decreases with his initial bargaining power. However, a takeover which creates enough value has a positive impact on investment from both the stakeholder and the firm. We discuss the effect of takeover defence mechanisms, applications and extensions to trade credit, the role of ESOPs and unions, and some implications for comparative financial systems, and we derive a number of empirical predictions. (JEL: G34)
Introduction
Over the last few decades, the respective merits and costs of an active market for corporate control have been hotly debated in the economics and finance profession. Most finance scholars argue that takeover activity is accompanied by a greater use of tax gains, operating and financial synergies, improved managerial discipline and more flexibility in internal capital markets (see, among many others, Jensen (1988) and Grinblatt and Titman (1998), ch. 19) . Others argue, however, that it leads managers to make myopic investment decisions (Stein (1988) ), that it makes firms suffer from the disadvantages of corporate diversification (Morck et al (1990) ), and that it prevents firms from entering implicit contracts with workers (Shleifer and Summers (1988) ). This paper examines this last argument that takeovers affect stakeholders while taking into account the advantages of a well-functioning market for corporate control in terms of value creation. We focus on the long-term strategic interactions between an incumbent manager, a potential acquirer, and a stakeholder as well as the impact of takeover threats on investment decisions.
At least three types of stakeholders can be affected by the possibility of a takeover: debtholders, trading partners, and workers. So far, the most popular proxy used to analyze the effect of takeovers on stakeholders has been the behavior of unions during or before the takeover process. Among others, Rosett (1990) finds that a wealth transfer from workers to shareholders accounts for 10% (resp. 5%) of the hostile (resp. friendly) takeover premium within 18 years after the takeover. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989) find that, after takeovers, firms tend to cut the labor force in central offices 1 . In addition, Warga and Welch (1993) and Asquith and Wizman (1993) document that bondholder losses account for a small but significant fraction of takeover premia. Most empirical 1 The business press is replete with examples of unions acting strategically with raiders. For example, in the US airline industry, the tough raider Lorenzo repeatedly failed to obtain wage concessions and good service from the workers of the airlines companies he took over. After Lorenzo's raids on TWA in 1985 and Eastern Airlines in 1986, the unions not only refused to make concessions, but also looked for a white knight. They promised substantial wage concessions in exchange for the white knight overbidding Lorenzo. This succeeded for TWA where Icahn was offered 300 million dollars by the unions and, as a result, could overbid Lorenzo and finally bought the firm. The strategy failed for Eastern Airlines however, when Lorenzo demanded an unacceptable price. Later on, the Lorenzo empire collapsed (see Bernstein (1990) ). Interestingly, although he was not as tough as Lorenzo, Icahn was far from being considered as a manager who accommodated unions. In this paper, we point out that for a given amount of wage concessions only a hard-nose manager could act credibly as a white knight.
papers, however, use small samples. So far, little work has been done on the impact of takeovers on trading partners, and on testing the implicit contract hypothesis, i.e. the ex ante effect of an active market for corporate control on relationships with stakeholders.
The reasons for this are probably that academics have found it difficult to obtain large data sets which make it easy to test this hypothesis with trading partners, and to derive interesting proxies to measure ex ante effects. In this paper, we focus on the effect of takeover threats on long-term relationships with stakeholders by drawing on the insights found in the recent literature on incomplete contracts and the hold-up problem 2 . We further discuss our results in light of existing empirical evidence, and we provide further empirical predictions about the effect of the possibility of a takeover on trading partners (including trade credit), debtholders, and workers.
A central feature of our analysis is that takeover threats dramatically affect the impact of the incumbent manager's bargaining power on wage flexibility and investment. In the absence of takeovers, the stakeholder's bargaining power enhances his investment, as he expects to benefit more from this investment in future wage negotiations. Hence, the firm's capacity to invest is higher, but its incentive to invest is lower 3 . However, under the threat of a takeover which only transfers wealth from stakeholders to shareholders, the stakeholders' wage flexibility decreases with their bargaining power since the higher the latter, the higher the incentive for an acquirer to take over the firm to renege on future transfers. Thus, when the stakeholders' bargaining power decreases, his investment can 2 The hold-up problem arises when a party who privately incurs the cost of an investment, but only obtains a fraction of the return generated by this investment, is thus led to underinvest. The analysis of this problem has been a popular proxy for transaction costs in modern theories of the firm (see, among many others, Grossman and Hart (1986) and Tirole (1999) ), as well as in the theoretical analysis of industrial relations (Grout (1984) ).
3 For instance, we suggest that German unions' power induces them to agree on substantial real wage concessions in bad times (Layard et al (1991) ) because they are confident they can secure benefits in future good times. This, however, comes at the cost of higher labor costs and a reduced incentive to invest from the firm's viewpoint, which has already been emphasized (Baldwin (1983) , Deere (1993a, 1993b) and Grout (1984) ). More generally, the idea that a principal may benefit from giving power to an agent has recently received a lot of attention. Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that to delegate authority may foster the agent's initiative. Dispersed ownership can commit shareholders to free ride and not to acquire information which may be used to overrule a manager (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) ), and not to renege upon the promises of deferred compensation to managers or workers (Habib (1997) ). The manager's and workers' efforts thus decrease as the ownerhip becomes more dispersed. Our analysis focuses on the effects of expected bargaining outcomes (rather than those of authority or free riding) on several aspects of economic activity.
be increased without triggering a takeover. Furthermore, value creation by the acquirer ex post alleviates this underinvestment problem.
Since we focus on the effect of takeovers on stakeholder investment, we deliberately focus on a situation where a project depends primarily on this investment 4 . We consider the special case where an entrepreneur runs a project whose future returns increase as the stakeholder exerts more effort. We suppose that this long-term relationship is governed by a sequence of short-term contracts. The expected negotiation of future short-term contracts affects ex ante investments and, more generally, self-enforcing, (i.e. implicit), contracts. When takeovers are precluded, the entrepreneur may be better off having sufficiently low bargaining power since the stakeholder is ready to invest more because he anticipates a larger share of future profits 5 . Conversely, under a strong bargainer, the hold-up problem on the stakeholder's side is more severe since the stakeholder does not expect much from the future and invests less. On the other hand, if the stakeholder's bargaining power is too high, then the entrepreneur is induced to underinvest. There is a tradeoff (from both the entrepreneur's and the social point of view) between the increased cost restricting the firm's incentive to invest and the benefits of a higher investment from the stakeholder.
These results, however, are dramatically affected by the possibility of takeovers. In our setup, takeovers are made by acquirers who have two characteristics: (1) they may, or may not, increase the firm's value, and (2) they may provide the acquirer with a higher fraction of the surplus created when bargaining with stakeholders. When only the wealth transfer characteristics matter, the sustainability of implicit contracts is constrained by the possibility of takeovers which are aimed at accruing gains to the acquirer by reducing future transfers. Once the investments are sunk, a tougher acquirer would earn more when bargaining than the incumbent entrepreneur. This gives the former an incentive to 4 The concept of investment is meant to include a temporary financial concession or trade credit which would involve an implicit contract.
5 Implicit contracts are often formalized in models of reputation. Reputation effects can help sustain implicit labour contracts in which the stakeholders make a non verifiable effort against the promise of a future payment by their employer (Bull (1987) ). By reneging on her promise, the employer would harm her reputation so that stakeholders would be reluctant to enter into such agreements in the future. In what follows, we shall use either soft or weak and either tough or strong since we study a trivial case of reputation in which a strong entrepreneur cannot commit not to use her bargaining strength, i.e., not to be tough. The enforcement mechanism is the expected outcome of future negotiations. take over the firm. When the takeover is costly, the stakeholder restricts his investment either to a level that prevents the takeover when possible or, alternatively, to a level that is compatible with the tough acquirer running the firm. Preventing the takeover can even require an investment that is lower than the investment that would accommodate it. When the surplus becomes low, the stakeholder is better off making a wage concession that is conditional upon the incumbent entrepreneur maintaining control. Furthermore, under the threat of a takeover, the stakeholder's investment increases with the incumbent entrepreneur's bargaining power. Increasing the latter reduces the incentive to take over the firm.
However, potential acquirers may create rather than transfer value. The market for corporate control allocates shares to those who value them most highly. Value creation alleviates the wealth transfer problem since stakeholders obtain a (smaller) fraction of a larger pie. If the value created is large enough, a takeover by a tough acquirer may even be desirable for stakeholders. If a takeover with significant value creation is expected, then it increases investment from both the firm and stakeholders ex ante. Shareholder value, unfortunately, does not distinguish between value creation and wealth transfer. In addition, even if a takeover creates value ex post, a takeover defence mechanism may still act as a guarantee for stakeholders that they will not be expropriated from the revenues of their effort and would still have a positive effect on their investment. In this setup, a takeover defence mechanism would ideally allow all value increasing takeovers to occur and ensure that there is no wealth transfer. When potential acquirers have different valuations which are not verifiable, anti-takeover defences should be endogenous and therefore implicit. Takeover defence mechanisms can help to sustain implicit contracts.
Written anti-takeover contracts (e.g. poison pills) that increase the takeover cost are too rigid to satisfy this condition: they cannot allow for all desirable takeovers and protect implicit contracts at the same time. Giving the stakeholder the right to reject the takeover (which can be done with blocks of shares for trading partners, unions' rights in directory boards in Germany or with Employee Stock Ownership plans (hereafter ESOPs) in the US) increases flexibility, but this may protect inefficient implicit contracts by allowing the stakeholder to maintain too high his bargaining power.
The argument that the gains in hostile takeovers may derive from the breach of implicit contracts in the target firm has been developed in Shleifer and Summers' (1988) seminal paper. The authors assume that the incumbent managers are committed to respect implicit contracts with workers 6 . Holmström's (1988) comment supports their point that a manager with a reputation for softness will not be able to obtain drastic concessions when necessary and that she must be replaced for the firm to obtain wage concessions. In contrast, the starting point for our model is that when the outcome of future negotiations is at stake, only an entrepreneur who can commit not to be tough in the future can change her negotiation position and obtain more concessions from the stakeholders in the absence of subsequent takeover threats. Under takeover threats, however, the stakeholders may invest more and even be better off facing a sufficiently tough incumbent manager. They may also benefit from giving away power to the incumbent manager.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the effect of future negotiations on the stakeholder's effort. Section 4 analyzes the impact of takeovers and takeover defence mechanisms on effort and on how effort varies with bargaining power. Section 5 analyzes the case of a financially constrained investment from the firm and derives applications and extensions to trade credit, to a comparative discussion of ESOPs and union power, and to the analysis of comparative financial systems and presents a number of empirical predictions. Section 6 concludes.
The Model

The Firm and the Stakeholder
An entrepreneur E wants to undertake a two-stage project. The project requires an action from a stakeholder in both stage 1. The stakeholder's action is a non-contractible and firm-specific effort e at cost c(e) = e 7 . In addition, denote w t the stage t ∈ {1, 2}
6 Thus, the bidder must sack the incumbent manager, i.e. the takeover must be "hostile", in order to renege on the implicit contracts. However, we argue later in this paper that the analysis of a three-tier hierarchy could lead to the result that friendly takeovers may also lead to a breach of trust. This is consistent with empirical studies (Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989) , Rosett (1990) ).
7 Alternatively, we could assume that a stage 2 action is fully contractible from the end of stage 1 onwards.
price he obtains for his action. Let w 0 be the stakeholder's outside opportunity price in each stage.
We shall call w 2 − w 1 the price (or wage) flexibility 8 . For simplicity, we assume that the input market in stage 1 is perfectly competitive unless otherwise specified.
Under the incumbent entrepreneur, the project generates a return R(e) in stage 2.
We assume that R is twice differentiable with R > 0, R < 0 and R (0) = +∞.
For convenience, we set f (e) = R(e) − w 0 and assume that f (0) = 0. The project is profitable, i.e. ∃e ∈ IR + , R(e) ≥ 2w 0 + e. The entrepreneur's objective function is π = R(e) − w 1 − w 2 and the stakeholder's is w 1 + w 2 − e. For simplicity, we assume that the discount rate is zero.
Assumption 1 : Long term contracts are not feasible.
Assumption 2 : The stage 2 bargaining game proceeds as follows: a take-it-or-leave-it offer is made by the entrepreneur with probability p and by the stakeholder with probability (1 − p). We call p the (publicly observable) entrepreneur's bargaining power.
Several factors may affect bargaining power. For instance, when there are several stakeholders represented by a syndicate, the syndicate's bargaining power is likely to increase with the number of stakeholders; more representation brings more dues which can be spent on negotiating, looking for outside options, financing industrial actions, etc. It may also commit more stakeholders to the actions decided by the syndicate.
In addition, bargaining power can reflect characteristics of the production technology and/or the nature of the effort. For instance, the entrepreneur's bargaining power is likely to be low when the stakeholder hired in stage 1 is crucial for the realization of the return and when his effort is an investment which other firms value. These factors themselves may depend on the entrepreneur's skills and the production technology 9 . The bargaining power may also be affected by the concentration in ownership structure or the 8 All our results concerning the price flexibility also hold if it is defined as w 0 − w 1 . 9 The entrepreneur's monitoring and/or production technologies may make him more or less dependent on the initial stakeholder. For instance, the entrepreneur may learn how to perform a number of productive and monitoring tasks. Since she will not be able to perform the tasks she did not learn, not to learn some tasks is a commitment to delegate. The stakeholder will observe what tasks the entrepreneur can perform, what tasks will be delegated to him and thus how necessary he is likely to be. delegation of control: for instance, if the entrepreneur is the most important shareholder of the firm, she is more willing to spend time and effort in haggling when her share is large 10 . Next, the different pricing or bargaining strategy subsequent to a takeover could be captured by modelling the idea that a takeover increases market power, whether it is a horizontal or a vertical merger (Chemla (2000)).
The Acquirer
After the stage 1 effort is exerted, but before the return is made verifiable, a potential acquirer decides whether or not to acquire the firm. The acquirer differs from the incumbent entrepreneur E in two respects.
• His bargaining power is q > p. An entrepreneur's type is common knowledge and can be viewed as a reputation that the entrepreneurs cannot manipulate 11 . For instance, this may reflect the idea that takeovers are accompanied by a higher concentration in ownership structure and a more rigorous management (see Habib (1997) and Jarrell et al (1988) ).
• The stage 2 return under the potential acquirer isαR, whereα is an observable, but not verifiable, random variable which is realized at the end of stage 1. In other words, A's valuation differs' from E's and is not known in advance. For
In addition to the cost of acquiring shares, the acquirer needs to bear a fixed cost C to take over the firm. We say that a takeover is (ex post) value increasing (resp. value decreasing) when the realization α ofα satisfies (resp. violates) αR(e) − C > R(e), i.e.
How the surplus is shared between the acquirer and the incumbent entrepreneur does not affect the analysis. However, the empirical evidence that the stock prices of acquired 10 In this case, we shall see that as in Habib (1997) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1995) , the entrepreneur may wish to be a small shareholder because this commits him not to spend much on haggling. However, we shall keep the bargaining power exogenous.
11 For instance, their behavior depends on education and values taught to them earlier and which may be very costly to manipulate (Akerlof (1983) ). Similarly, one might think that people acquire and use some skills and that new skills affecting their bargaining power are too costly or too long to acquire. firms increase much more than those of acquiring firms suggests that the incumbent entrepreneur should have a large bargaining power 12 .
The Timing
To sum up, the sequence of events is as follows:
• In stage 1, the stakeholder is hired via a contract which specifies a payment w 1 .
He exerts an effort e ∈ IR + at cost c(e) = e and is paid w 1 . Then,α is realized and the potential acquirer A decides to whether or not take over the firm. Next, the entrepreneur decides whether or not to make the profit verifiable.
• In stage 2, the two parties bargain over a payment w 2 and sign a contract. Finally, a return R(e) is generated and the stakeholder receives w 2 .
The Impact of Negotiation on the Stakeholder's Investment
In this section, we assume away takeovers, i.e. C = +∞. The firm can only realize a return R(e) under the incumbent entrepreneur. However, signing a contract contingent on the effort or on the profit in stage 1 is assumed to be either impossible or too costly.
For a high level of effort to be chosen, the parties have to rely on self-enforcing contracts.
For example, paying the stakeholder ex ante so that he makes an effort is not selfenforcing since he could take the money and leave the firm or shirk. What makes the agreement self-enforcing here is that the entrepreneur has to reward the stakeholder after the latter exerts his effort to realize a profit.
We proceed by backward induction and first derive w 2 . With probability p, the entrepreneur offers w 2 = w 0 to the stakeholder who does not benefit from his effort.
With probability 1 − p, the stakeholder offers w 2 = R(e) and appropriates the whole surplus. Hence, in expected terms, (E)w 2 is given by
In equilibrium, the stakeholder exerts e * * = arg max
which leads to
This effort is lower than the first best level of effort e * which maximizes f (e) − e,
i.e. such that f (e * ) = 1, that the entrepreneur could obtain via an incentive contract signed in stage 1 if complete long-term contracts were feasible. There is underprovision of effort with respect to the social optimum as soon as the entrepreneur's bargaining power is strictly positive. When the stakeholder is hired, his individual rationality (IR) constraint is
Since the initial input market is perfectly competitive, this constraint is binding.
Therefore, the initial payment is w 1 = 2w 0 + e * * − w 2 ≤ w 0 + e * * (with equality only for e = 0). The stakeholder expects to enjoy rents in stage 2 and is ready to work at a low payment in stage 1.
In addition, the competitive initial input market enables the entrepreneur to appropriate all the rents ex ante so that her payoff coincides with the social surplus. It is an increasing function of the effort up to the first best effort level and we obtain the following result 13 : The flexibility offered by having a powerful stakeholder has many other advantages, including avoiding bankruptcy. Assume K < w 1 + i, where i is the cost of buying equipment necessary to realize the project. The liquidation value of the equipment is i at the end of stage 1 and 0 in stage 2. Suppose that a return R 0 ≥ w 0 +i−K is realized in stage 1 with probability 1 − . With probability , there is no return in stage 1. Assume that the stage 1 contract cannot be made contingent on whether R 0 is generated or not.
If no return is realized in stage 1, the stakeholder must accept a payment K − i to avoid bankruptcy while he would obtain K if bankruptcy occured (leading to R(e) = 0). He does so w 2 − w 0 = (1 − p)f (e) ≥ i. Bankruptcy will occur with probability unless the stakeholder's bargaining power is large enough.
Note that an imperfect initial input market would make the entrepreneur's objective function differ from that of a social planner. Since the entrepreneur could not appropriate the whole surplus ex ante, an decrease in p may hurt her and not be Pareto-improving.
For instance, if the stakeholder must be hired at w 1 = w 0 < K or if the stakeholder has his bargaining power in stage 1 and 2, the effort and the social surplus are still decreasing in p, but π is non monotonic in p as the entrepreneur faces a tradeoff between providing incentives to the stakeholder and reducing costs. When K < w 0 , the stakeholder must 14 Similarly, for a given p, the effort increases with the marginal return on effort R . This suggests that the degree of competition in the product market should affect the impact of bargaining on the stakeholder's effort. For instance, if competition decreases the marginal return on effort, stakeholder power matters more when competition decreases.
agree on a concession for the project to be undertaken. He will only do this if w 2 − w 0 ≥ w 0 + w 1 , i.e. if his bargaining power is high enough. But if a less profitable project can be financed with K only or if there is a risk of bankruptcy, it may not be in the interest of the entrepreneur to have a bargaining power which is low enough to obtain a stage 1 concession or to avoid the risk of bankruptcy, although it is socially desirable.
Indeed, the main conceptual changes introduced here are that when the input market is imperfect, the entrepreneur may not be better off having low bargaining power and that she must be financially constrained to obtain stage 1 concessions 15 .
Takeovers and Implicit Contracts
In this section, we analyze the impact of a takeover threat on the stakeholder's effort.
We set C < +∞. We shall consider the variables to be functions of the entrepreneur's bargaining power:
The Impact of Wealth Transfers on Efficiency:
In this subsection, we show that the threat of takeovers whose main motive is to reduce payments to the stakeholder prevent the entrepreneur from committing to some implicit contracts. Such a takeover threat can induce the stakeholder to underinvest and lower the social surplus and the entrepreneur's profit. Furthermore, we show that the stakeholder's effort may decrease with his initial bargaining power. We first assume that the same return, R(e), can be realized under either the incumbent entrepreneur or the acquirer,
i.e. they differ in their bargaining power only 16 . In other words, α =ᾱ = 1.
, the threat of a takeover which would be purely wealth redistributive reduces both the stakeholder's effort and the social surplus. There exists e < e(q) such that: 2. If C < (q − p)f (e), then the effort is e(q) and the takeover takes place.
The effort is restricted by the mere threat of a takeover. The only incentive for A to take over the firm is to breach implicit contracts. When the effort is high, the return and the incentive to breach implicit contracts are high. Thus, the stakeholder may exert an effort low enough to prevent the takeover, i.e., chooseê such that
In addition, an increase in the incumbent entrepreneur's bargaining power reduces the incentive for a acquirer to take over the firm to gain from a lower w 2 . Thus, the stakeholder can exert a higher effort while still preventing the takeover. Therefore, the stakeholder's effort decreases with his bargaining power.
The stakeholder is not always better off reducing his effort to prevent the takeover.
When this strategic effort reduces the pie too much, he is better off enlarging the pie, i.e., exerting e(q), and negotiating with A. However, he may be ready to reduce the pie below that under A to keep a larger share: we may observe a lower effort under the threat of a takeover by A than e(q).
Overall, as p increases from 0 to 1, the effort (and, hence, the social surplus) first decreases in the range where there are takeovers, then increases in the range where there are takeover threats, and finally decreases again when the takeover cost is so high that there is no takeover threat. Effort is maximized for the smallest bargaining power such that the firm is not the subject of a takeover threat.
Hence, when the takeover is purely wealth redistributive and when its threat creates a hold-up problem with stakeholders, takeover defence mechanisms (TDM) may be desirable. TDMs can either increase the takeover cost (e.g. a poison pill or the obligation to declare a toehold even lower than what is required by legislation) or confer the stakeholder the ability to prevent a takeover. This can be achieved either by voting or veto rights in the directory board (as in Germany for unions) or blockholdings such as either ESOPs or suppliers' blocks of shares in continental European countries and in a Japanese keiretsu 17 . In this subsection, both types of TDMs are equivalent; they both prevent the takeover. Since the takeover is purely redistributive, both systems ensure that there is no breach of implicit contracts and that there is no takeover. Both of them lead to higher levels of effort, more surplus and a higher payoff for the incumbent entrepreneur when the initial input market is perfect. With an imperfect input market, the entrepreneur may obtain more by favouring a takeover than by setting up takeover defence mechanisms.
Wealth Transfer versus Value Creation
We now address the case where the entrepreneur and the acquirer also differ in their ability to run the firm. The acquirer's valuation in stage 1 isαR, whereα is an observable, but not verifiable, random variable, which is uniformly distributed on [α,ᾱ] with 0 < α < 1 <ᾱ, and which is realized at the end of stage 1.
The acquirer takes over when q(αR(e) − w 0 ) − C > p(R(e) − w 0 ), that is, when
In particular, α A ≤ α V if and only if q ≥ pf (e)+C f (e)+C
. The acquirer benefits from the wealth transfer but he only appropriates a fraction of the increase in value. When q is high, he benefits a lot from the wealth transfer, and the hold-up from the stakeholder is limited.
Hence, q must be high enough for the acquirer to have an incentive to takeover the firm higher than that of the social planner.
After a takeover,
, w 2 is higher than under the incumbent entrepreneur and the stakeholder profits from the takeover. Otherwise, w 2 is lower than it would be absent the takeover. The acquirer only has a stronger incentive for taking over the firm than the stakeholder if q is high and p is low, because he can then benefit from a sufficiently high fraction of the value creation and potentially from some wealth transfer. In particular, if q < pf (e)+C f (e)+C , α S < α A . Hence, there may be values of α for which the stakeholder would welcome the takeover, but the acquirer does not want to takeover the firm. We thus obtain the following proposition:
value dcreasing takeovers may take place in order to benefit from a wealth transfer. If
(1 − q)C ≥ (q − p)f (e), then α S ≤ α V ≤ α A , i.e.
value increasing takeovers may not take place because the acquirer would bear all the cost of the takeover while he would appropriate only a fraction of the increase in value.
If the wealth transfer is higher than the hold-up from the stakeholder, a takeover must increase value substantially not to reduce w 2 . If the hold-up from the stakeholder is more important than the transfer of wealth to the acquirer, only takeovers which create enough value will take place and there is no wealth transfer. An efficient negotiation between the stakeholder and the acquirer should actually solve the latter problem, but could not solve the former. The stakeholders may promise a payment to the acquirer to induce him to takeover the firm. But, to the extent that they cannot prevent a takeover which would transfer wealth, they cannot obtain a transfer from the acquirer before the takeover. We focus hereafter on the case (1 − q)C < (q − p)f (e).
What effect do these results have on stakeholder's effort? The possibility of some ex post value increasing takeovers leading to a higher w 2 increases the effort ex ante and so the value of the firm. But the inability to commit to not transfer wealth from the stakeholder in some either value-increasing or value-decreasing takeovers leads the stakeholder to underinvest. At the time he exerts the effort, the stakeholder expects a payment of
An appropriate takeover defence mechanism would be to allow all value-increasing takeovers to occur while preventing the firm from transferring wealth from stakeholders after a potential takeover. A traditional anti-takeover mechanism (which increases the takeover cost) can not only prevent value-decreasing takeovers, but it would have to also prevent some value-increasing takeovers to make sure that there is no transfer wealth from the stakeholder. We thus obtain the following proposition: 
Proof: See Appendix 2
The intuition behind this result is simple. When C is low enough to allow all possible value increasing takeovers to occur, some of them can breach implicit contracts. On the other hand, when C is high enough to protect the implicit contracts, a value increasing takeover may be prevented. A could buy the firm, pay C and breach implicit contracts for some realizations ofα and could be prevented from buying the firm for others. C should depend on A's valuation, but that is impossible sinceα is not contractible. Thus, a takeover cost C induces inefficiencies. In contrast, the veto right enables the stakeholder to react ex post and case by case. There is no breach of implicit contracts and the takeovers which take place are exactly the socially desirable ones 18 .
Applications and Extensions
We now examine voluntary stage 1 concessions by the stakeholder, and the effect of takeovers on the investment by both the firm and the stakeholder when the stakeholder's investment is to provide financing for the firm's investment. We further discuss extensions and applications to trade credit, union power and ESOPs, and financial systems, and we derive empirical predictions.
18 With a competitive input market, the stakeholder cannot use his veto power to get a rent. When E does not have all the bargaining power with A, the stakeholder's veto power may enable her to extract ex ante a share of A's surplus. The stakeholder anticipates that he can use his veto power when bargaining with A for some values of α, and he can be hired at a low w 1 . When the initial input market is imperfect, the stakeholder can use his veto power to obtain a part of the surplus, depending on his bargaining game with A.
Voluntary Stage 1 Concessions to Prevent a Takeover
When the takeover transfers wealth from stakeholders to shareholders, a natural question to ask is whether the stakeholder may be tempted to make a concession in stage 2 to prevent the takeover.
Corollary 2 : Assume that the takeover is purely redistributive. When possible, the stakeholder makes a concession on his stage 2 payment conditional upon E keeping control when C < (q − p)f [q]. The effort is e(q).
Proof: See Appendix.
2
When the takeover does not take place, the incumbent entrepreneur and the stakeholder save C (or part of it if the acquirer has some bargaining power). The concession
ing. When making a concession, the stakeholder must give away the whole surplus he would get under E compared to A net of the takeover cost. Ex ante, his effort satisfies
A concession leads him to exert e(q). His IC constraint, which
, so that he is better off exerting e(q) and conceding
a concession leads the stakeholder to exert an effort which is lower than that without a concession, and the pie is smaller. He is better off not making the concession and preventing the takeover only by a restriction in his effort 19 .
Investment from the firm
Assume now that the return is a function of a non-contractible investment I from the entrepreneur. For the sake of clarity, we shall focus on the case where the entrepreneur is financially constrained and where she cannot obtain enough funds from outside investors
19 Similarly, if the incumbent entrepreneur were A and this implied a cost higher than the takeover cost, the stakeholder would sometimes be better off promising a concession to E to induce him to take over the firm. This is what happened at TWA and Eastern Airlines. Such a concession may not take place when the takeover cost is too high, the stakeholders face a wealth constraint (and credit rationing) or a coordination failure (so that a subsequent free rider problem among the stakeholders cannot be overcome), or the stakeholders want to build a reputation for refusing oncessions.
to finance the project. In other words, the initial capital K available to the entrepreneur is assumed to include these funds.
We initially rule out takeovers. When the stakeholder's bargaining power increases, higher stakeholder's stage 1 flexibility comes at the expense of the entrepreneur's incentive to invest. Assume that R is a function of I. Ex ante, the entrepreneur appropriates all the surplus, so that, ex ante, her incentive to invest the first best I * is not affected by p. However, after hiring the stakeholder, the entrepreneur's incentive to invest increases with p. But, her actual investment must satisfy the budget constraint
which becomes tighter when p increases. When she cannot commit to invest at the beginning of the game, the entrepreneur chooses I so as to maximize pf (I) − I subject to the constraint I ≤ K − w 0 + (1 − p)f (I), which implies
Hence, there are both costs and benefits for the manager and the stakeholders of having a high bargaining power.
Corollary 3 : The higher the stakeholder's bargaining power, the higher the entrepreneur's capacity to undertake an investment, but the lower her incentive to invest when choosing
I.
When the stakeholder is hired at w 0 and the entrepreneur can finance I = K − w 0 < f −1 (1/p), the stakeholder makes a price concession to finance a further investment ∆I up to ∆I ∈ arg max 2w 0 − ∆I + (1 − p)f (I + ∆I), that is, up to (1 − p)f (I + ∆I) = 1. Thus, the price concession increases with the stakeholder's bargaining power. Nevertheless, the entrepreneur's incentive to invest may become so low when p decreases that the restriction in I may outweigh the increase in the share of the pie for the stakeholder.
In this case, the stakeholder anticipates that a price concession will not be used fully to invest, and price flexibility may actually decrease with his bargaining power.
We now allow for takeovers to occur. An analysis analogous to that of Proposition 2 establishes that the takeover threat reduces the price flexibility (and thus the capital necessary to undertake the project) which, however, increases with p. Hence, when R is a function of I, the possibility of a takeover may be either desirable or not. When the entrepreneur is not financially constrained, a takeover increases E's marginal reward of investment and is desirable. If p is low enough to allow the takeover, the stakeholder cannot prevent it. When the entrepreneur is financially constrained, we obtain the following corollary: A takeover reducing the stakeholder's bargaining power increases E's incentive to invest. When I is financially constrained and the initial input market is perfect, the
is tighter when the takeover is expected.
When the initial input market is imperfect, the stakeholder's decision to agree on a price concession is affected by the takeover threat as he may be better off either making the price concession to finance an investment that allows for the takeover to occur or strategically limit his price concession to make sure that the actual investment will not entail a takeover. In this latter case, the possibility of a takeover may only decrease the investment 20 .
The possibility of value-increasing takeovers increases the firm's incentive to invest.
This incentive to invest would increase not only because of the value creation, but also due to the fact that the hold-up problem from the stakeholder would be somewhat mitigated. The ability for the firm to appropriate a larger fraction of the return created by her investment would stimulate her incentive to invest. On the other hand, following our analysis in section 4, the possibility of wealth transfer may still make the financial constraint tighter than if the stakeholder had the possibility to block the sale of the firm.
As a direct consequence, when the firm's incentive to invest is more important than the stakeholder's price flexibility, there should be a very low C and no veto power. The veto right would enable the stakeholder to keep an excessive bargaining power and imply inefficient levels of investment. Finally, the entrepreneur (as well as a social planner) is led to opt for TDMs such as a veto right when the investment is financially constrained and no defence when investment is not dramatically financially constrained.
ESOPs and Union Power
Empirical papers testing the "implicit contracts" hypothesis have generally focused on a measure of a transfer of wealth from workers to shareholders. In this paper, we view ESOPs and union power as close substitutes with respect to their effect on takeovers and investment. Our predictions help reconcile appearantly conflicting empirical results.
Among others, Rosett (1990) finds that a wealth transfer from workers to shareholders accounts for 10% (resp. 5%) of the hostile (resp. friendly) takeover premium within 18 years after the takeover. On the other hand, Neuman and Sharpe (1996) find that the probability of a takeover taking place is not significantly higher in industries where stakeholders have higher rents. However, this may well be an equilibrium outcome. In our setup, introducing uncertainty would actually lead to this result although takeover threats do have long term effects on industrial relations and stakeholders' rents. Similarly, for a range of parameters, takeover threats have a real effect although takeovers do not take place 21 .
Our analysis leads to further testable predictions. Our results are particularly relevant for firms that cannot monitor the stakeholder's investment ex ante via, say, an explicit contract. In addition, the benefits of input price flexibility in terms of investment are particularly high when the firm's access to outside finance is restricted. When the firm is a potential target (resp. when takeovers are impossible), we would expect high workers' bargaining power to restrict investment and to reduce shareholder wealth further (resp.
to increase investment and to have a more positive effect on shareholder wealth) for firms in industries where work is more difficult to monitor and financial constraints are more likely to bind. Hence, we expect ESOPs to increase price flexibility and to be 21 Another strand of empirical papers focuses on the reorganization of production and the labor force after takeovers. For example, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989) find that central and production offices that changed owners between 1977 and 1982 had substantially lower employment growth during that period than central offices not changing owners. Such reorganizations may well represent value creation more than wealth transfers from stakeholders, trading partners or the taxpayer to shareholders. However, we are not aware of any study which attempts to estimate the actual cost to labor and/or society associated with layoffs and reorganization. used more widely in firms which are subject more heavily to financial constraints. We also expect shareholder wealth to be affected positively (resp. negatively) by ESOPs in firms whose profits (resp. do not) depend considerably on non-contractible stakeholders' investment and whose stakeholders do not (resp. do) have excessive rents. Our analysis is consistent with apparently conflicting empirical evidence on the effects of ESOPs on shareholders' wealth (Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1994) , Dhillon and Ramirez (1994) and Gordon and Pound (1990) ). While the first two papers respectively find no significant impact and a positive impact of ESOPs on shareholder wealth, the third one finds that ESOPs established in the presence of takeover activity reduced stock prices (by 4%).
To reconcile these findings, it is important to recognize that this takeover activity may mean precisely that these ESOPs were established in a period where wealth transfers were important rather than in an "investment" period. The timing of ESOPs affects crucially their impact on shareholder wealth.
Our analysis also suggests that (1) unionization reduces investment more in firms which are potential takeover targets (partial empirical evidence on this is provided by Bronars and Deere (1993) ) and (2) the decline of unions in the American and British private sectors in the past decades may be positively correlated with the development of the market for corporate control in these countries. In particular, this latter prediction is entirely consistent with the empirical observation that rates of unionization decreased in the private sector but increased in the public sector in the US in the 1980s (Lazear's symposium (1988) ). However, we are not aware of any specific academic work on this correlation. We predict that a cross-sectional time series analysis would exhibit a pattern where firms with important implicit contracts (a proxy could be stakeholders' age) saw their unions/stakeholders' bargaining power particularly reduced subsequent to a more precise takeover threat or a higher takeover activity.
Suppliers and Trade Credit
Vertical relationships may also be affected by redistributive takeovers. Direct evidence on this is difficult to track down because most input prices in long-term relationships are generally difficult to obtain. It would be interesting to examine the stock price reaction of (closely) vertically related firms after the announcement of a takeover.
Trade credit has been surprisingly overlooked in the literature on takeovers and stakeholders. However, short-term trade credit (which is often rolled over) is a significant feature of long-term relationships with trading partners. Arguably, trade credit is also an area where there are implicit agreements and/or incomplete contracts. We believe that trade credit is part of the compensation of a supplier. When a supplier makes a specific investment, he expects a transfer which includes the price for the input and the money he makes from trade credit. Prices for input are difficult to observe, but trade credit is not. Takeovers may then lead to wealth transfers from suppliers and affect the terms of the trade credit.
The wealth transfer hypothesis may well be easier to test in trade credit than in industrial relations, where so many possible contingencies may be observed. Our analysis predicts that (1) takeover targets have trade credit at more unfavorable terms than other firms before the takeover and that these terms improve after the takeover, and (2) that suppliers who have blocks of shares in firms are more likely to extend trade credit, and at better terms than other suppliers. In addition, our results are consistent with the fact that firms in financial distress would increase trade credit compared to other forms of debt (Franks and Sussman (2000) provide some evidence on this) and that countries like Japan and Germany have more trade credit than countries with an active market for corporate control like the US.
Comparative Financial Systems
Our results are also consistent with Asquith and Wizman's (1990) and Warga and Welch's (1993) papers which document that bondholders losses account for a significant fraction of takeover premia after the announcement of LBOs. In addition, bonds with strong covenant protection gain value. In LBOs, the increase in shareholders' bargaining power is probably significant due to an increase in leverage.
Our results predict that debtholders suffer less from losses from takeovers in countries where they have blocks of shares. As a result, we believe that the market for corporate control makes firms more financially constrained when they do not have a creditor among their large shareholders.
Concluding Remarks
This paper pointed out that the threat of a takeover leading to a reduction in the future bargained price reduces price flexibility and stakeholders' effort, which, in turn, restricts the firm's capacity to invest. The most efficient takeover defence mechanisms would allow all value-increasing takeovers while prohibiting any potential wealth transfers ex ante. Blocks of shares or veto power, by giving a stakeholder the power to block a takeover, would provide the best possible takeover defence mechanisms. By prohibiting wealth transfers, they actually increase stakeholder's investment, financially constrained investment, profits and shareholder wealth. However, this comes at the cost of preventing value-increasing takeovers, and reinforces the hold-up problem created by the fact that stakeholders appropriate a fraction of the increase in value while the bidder bears the full costs of his takeover. Ex ante, takeover defence mechanisms increase the investment from the stakeholder and relaxes the firm's budget constraint, but they decrease the shareholder's incentive to invest. Takeover defence mechanisms should thus be adopted by firms which value non-contractible investment from stakeholders highly. This had a number of empirical implications on intrafirm and interfirm relationships as well as on comparative financial systems.
Although our discussion focused on takeovers via a financial market, our results would hold with any party which might either take an action which transfers rents or be replaced by a tougher party at some cost. For instance, a firm may want to terminate an overfunded defined benefit pension plan (Petersen (1992) ). Alternatively, a government which is a priori favorable to stakeholders may see the implicit contracts he can enter constrained by the possibility of future elections leading to a new conservative government which is more favorable to shareholders. The incumbent government will thus need to be tough enough with stakeholders to be reelected. Being too soft would restrict the set of implicit contracts and would be socially inefficient. The main points remain valid for other cases such as the effect of costly financial manipulations on price negotiations (Perotti and Spier (1993) and Sarig (1992) ) and long term relationships between a supplier and a buyer (in our analysis, the stakeholder is nothing other than a supplier) 22 .
Our analysis constitutes a benchmark case toward a better understanding of the effect of corporate events on long-term relationships. Managers sign both financial and industrial contracts which they have in mind when they negotiate with stakeholders.
Controlling shareholders, potential acquirers and managers need to recognize the interactions and coordination problems between different middle managers and stakeholders as well. For instance, an agency problem between shareholders and a manager could lead to other kinds of inefficient implicit contracts than those considered here. Assume that implicit contracts can be agreed on between any two parties within shareholders, the CEO and stakeholders. Hence, for example, a takeover may be such that implicit contracts between the shareholders and the CEO (resp. the stakeholders) are not breached, but that those involving the stakeholders (resp. the CEO) are breached. Assuming that the acquirer has characteristics which allow him to enter more implicit contracts with the CEO than with the incumbent controlling shareholder, he can subsequently induce the CEO to breach implicit contracts and compensate him for the loss he incurs by breaching implicit contracts with stakeholders (e.g. reputation). Thus, a friendly takeover, as defined in Shleifer and Summers, could breach implicit contracts, which is consistent with empirical results (Rosett (1990) ). An important challenge is then to estimate, at the ex ante stage and at the firm's level, whether the implicit contracts hypothesis dominates or not the disciplinary role which takeovers play against inefficient implicit contracts.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1 :
We have to prove only that w 1 increases with p and that it is lower than w 0 .
∀p > p, ∀e ∈ IR + , (1 − p )f (e) − e < (1 − p)f (e) − e
This implies that
i.e., w 1 [p ] > w 1 [p] . Last, the stakeholder exerts the effort e if and only if e ≤
(1 − p)f (e). Therefore, w 1 ≤ w 0 .
However, π is not monotonic in p when the stakeholder must be hired at price w 0 . In this case, the total price is 2w 0 + (1 − p)f (e) so that his IR constraint (4) is slack. The stakeholder still maximizes (2) and e * * still decreases with p, while the entrepreneur's payoff is now π(e) = 1 − 1 f (e * * )
f (e * * ) − 2w 0 .
The derivative is
When p = 0, the effort is e * , so that π = [f · f ](e * ) − 1 < 0, while when p = 1, the effort is zero and π (0) > 0 (because f (0) = +∞). 2
Proof of Proposition 2 : Atakes over if and only if qf (e) − C > pf(e), that is
C < (q − p)f (e).
The RHS of (11) increases with e. When C is so high that (11) is not satisfied for e = e(p), Anever bids and the stakeholder chooses e = e(p) (which decreases with p).
, the stakeholder can deter the takeover by exerting a level of effortê ∈ [e(q), e(p)] such that C = (q − p)f (ê). Knowing this, he will choose an effort satisfying max{ max e∈ [0,ê] (1 − p)f (e) − e, max e∈ [ê,e(p)] (1 − q)f (e) − e}.
Given that max e∈ [ê,e(p)] (1 − q)f (e) − e ≤ max e∈ [0,e(p)] (1 − q)f (e) − e = (1 − q)f [q] − e(q)
the stakeholder anticipates that he always loses from the takeover and he exertsê in order to prevent it. He expects w 2 = (1 − p)f (ê) and obtains his stage 1 price of w 1 (ê).
When p varies and q and C are given,ê = f 
w 1 decreases and w 2 increases with p. The entrepreneur's bargaining power, p t , which maximizes the stakeholder's effort, satisfies (q
When C is so low that (11) is satisfied for e = e(q), the stakeholder can either choose a low effort e < e(q) satisfying D = (q −p)f (e) (the existence of e is ensured by continuity) so as to prevent the takeover and bargain w 2 with E or choose e(q) knowing that A will take over the firm. He will choose e if and only if
It is worthwile to choose a low effort to prevent the takeover when C is slightly lower than (q − p)f [q] . When C or p are very low, however, the stakeholder chooses e[q] (which does not vary with p), and R takes over the firm. In addition, it is clear that e increases with p. 2
Proof of Corollary 3 :
Allow the stakeholder to make a price concession b conditional upon the incumbent entrepreneur keeping control. Assume without loss of generality that the incumbent entrepreneur gets the entire surplus in the event of a takeover.
In stage 2, the stakeholder's price concession to induce the entrepreneur to keep control is realized. Since D 1 is lower than D 2 , no C can protect implicit contract and allow value-increasing takeovers.
(2) If the stakeholder has a veto right on the sale of the firm (and C is exogenous), he refuses any sale reducing his compensation ex post. If α(1 − q) ≥ (1 − p), he benefits from a takeover and will accept it. Otherwise, he accepts the takeover if and only if
